

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 09430

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM, UNGA, UR, US
SUBJECT: US/SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON THE SPECIAL SESSION
ON DISARMAMENT

SUMMARY: IN APRIL 28 DISCUSSION SOVIETS INDICATED THEIR
INTENTION TO ISSUE CALL AT SSOD FOR NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES
AND OTHERS TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON BREZHNEV PROPOSAL
FOR CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. LEONARD
AND YARMOLINSKY INDICATED THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE FOR SSOD
TO GIVE NEW IMPETUS TO DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS BUT THAT
PRESSING BREZHNEV PROPOSAL MIGHT PRODUCE NEGATIVE REACTIONS
UNLESS SOVIETS HAD SOME SOLUTIONS FOR WHAT APPEARED TO
US TO BE OVERWHELMING PERHAPS EVEN INSOLUBLE
VERIFICATION PROBLEMS. US SIDE SUGGESTED APPROPRIATE
NEXT STEPS TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT WERE CONCLUSION
OF SALT II AND CTB AND START OF SALT III NEGOTIATIONS.
DISCUSSION ALSO COVERED SECURITY ASSURANCES, CTB AND
NON-PROLIFERATION. ON MACHINERY ISSUES (SEPTTEL) SOVIETS
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INDICATED INTENTION TO MAINTAIN TOUGH POSITION ENVISAGING
ONLY MINIMAL CHANGES TO CCD AND MAINTAINING ITS AUTONOMY
FROM THE UNGA. THEY INDICATED READINESS AT END OF SSOD
TO CONCEDE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP IF OTHER ISSUES ARE SATISFACT-
ORILY RESOLVED. BOTH SIDES WERE RESERVED ON PROSPECTS
FOR ATTAINING CONSENSUS AT SSOD. SOVIETS ALSO PROVIDED
INFORMATION ON STATEMENT WHICH WILL ACCOMPANY THEIR

SIGNATURE OF PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO
(SEPTEL). END SUMMARY.

1. AMBASSADOR LEONARD AND ACDA COUNSELOR YARMOLINSKY MET WITH AMBASSADOR ISSRAELIAN ACCOMPANIED BY MESSRS. TIMERBAEV, NAZARKIN AND VAVILOV AT MFA GUEST HOUSE ON APRIL 28 FOR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD). THE DISCUSSION COVERED A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES IN THE PROGRAM OF ACTION AND MACHINERY SECTIONS OF THE SSOD DRAFT DOCUMENT. THIS MESSAGE REPORTS ON THE PROGRAM OF ACTION; SEPTEL COVERS THE MACHINERY PORTION OF THE DISCUSSION.

2. ISSRAELIAN OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY INDICATING THAT THE SOVIETS INTENDED TO PLACE THE EMPHASIS AT THE SSOD ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN THE PROGRAM OF ACTION RATHER THAN ON MACHINERY. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON THE SOVIET DECISION TO SIGN PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE EXPLANATIONS WHICH THEY WILL MAKE UPON SIGNING THE TREATY (DETAILS SEPTEL), ISSRAELIAN INITIATED A DISCUSSION ON THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT SECTION. THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, HE SAID, HAD MADE IT CLEAR IN THE PREPCOM THAT THEY INTENDED TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS FOR SOME KIND OF NEW COMMITMENTS. HE ALSO RECALLED, INTER ALIA, THE REFERENCES IN THE RESOLUTION
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ON SALT ADOPTED AT THE 32ND UNGA (32/87 G), TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S OCTOBER 4 STATEMENT TO THE ASSEMBLY, AND TO BREZHNEV'S NOVEMBER 2 STATEMENT OUTLINING DIFFERENT PROPOSALS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. HE ASKED FOR INDICATIONS ON HOW US ENVISAGED FOLLOW-UP TO THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AT THE SSOD AND THEN OUTLINED CURRENT SOVIET THINKING.

3. REFERRING TO BREZHNEV'S NOVEMBER 2, 1977 AND APRIL 25 SPEECHES, ISSRAELIAN SAID THAT IN ITS ADDRESS TO THE SSOD PLENARY USSR WILL STATE ITS READINESS TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT STARTING WITH THE QUESTION OF THE CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE USSR WILL CALL ON THE OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES AND OTHER MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT STATES TO JOIN IT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE TO START THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE MADE AT THE SSOD INCLUDING IF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON THE DATE AND PLACE OF THE FIRST SESSION. ISSRAELIAN FURTHER INDICATED THAT IN VIEW OF THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN SALT AND CTB NEGOTIATIONS, THIS APPEARED TO THE SOVIETS TO BE THE LOGICAL NEXT STEP TO TAKE. ASKED WHETHER THEIR

PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE CHINESE PARTICIPATION TO BEGIN THE NEGOTIATIONS, ISSRAELIAN INDICATED THAT IN GENERAL IT WAS NOT SOVIET POLICY TO WAIT FOR THE CHINESE IN ORDER TO TRY TO MOVE AHEAD IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

4. LEONARD SAID THAT, WHILE APPRECIATING THE IMPORTANCE OF TRYING TO GIVE SOME NEW IMPETUS TO THE PROCESS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS AT THE SSOD, WE HAD SUBSTANTIAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IN BREZHNEV'S APRIL 25 SPEECH AND THE DRAFT PROGRAM OF ACTION. THE US, HE SAID, ENVISAGED THAT THE NEXT STEPS WERE COMPLETION OF SALT II AND CTB, AND COMMENCEMENT OF SALT III. HE RECALLED THAT AS SOVIETS WERE AWARE THE POSSIBILITY OF PROPOSING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CUTOFF

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OF THE PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES WAS PRESENTLY UNDER REVIEW IN WASHINGTON, BUT

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NO DECISIONS AS TO WHETHER TO RAISE THIS AT SSOD HAD YET BEEN MADE. THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL INVOLVED VERY

SERIOUS - EVEN INSOLUBLE- PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE, LEONARD CONTINUED, TO RAISE THE HOPES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BY CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD WITHOUT RESULTS OR TO ENTER INTO THEM WITHOUT HAVING SOME IDEA HOW TO SOLVE THE CENTRAL VERIFICATION PROBLEMS INVOLVED. FURTHER THOUGHT, HE SAID, SHOULD BE GIVEN AS TO THE FEASIBILITY OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

4. TIMERBAEV RESPONDED THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED NOW WAS A POLITICAL DECISION. SALT I, CTB AND INDIAN OCEAN NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEGUN WITHOUT MUCH ADVANCE PREPARATION, OR CONSIDERATION OF DETAILS, AND THE VERIFICATION ISSUES HAD BEEN ADDRESSED ONLY IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN SUBSEQUENT PRIVATE DISCUSSION, TIMERBAEV INDICATED TO YARMOLINSKY THAT SOVIETS HAD NOT GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION, AND ASKED CONFIDENTIAL

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WHETHER THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL INVOLVED A GREATER VERIFICATION PROBLEM THAN THE CUTOFF PROPOSED. YARMOLINSKY SAID THIS WAS THE CASE, AFTER WHICH TIMERBAEV SEEMED TO CONSIDER THE MATTER BUT MADE NO FURTHER COMMENT.

5. LEONARD AND YARMOLINSKY ASKED TWICE ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL FOR NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TO THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS. ISSRAELYAN SAID SOVIETS HAD NO WISH TO DISRUPT THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD PROCEED ON THEIR OWN COURSE. THE ISSUE OF CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS AN ENTIRELY SEPARATE PROBLEM FROM SALT, WHICH CONCERNED ONLY DELIVERY VEHICLES. MOREOVER, THE INTENTION WAS TO TRY TO INVOLVE THE OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT STATES. ISSRAELYAN FURTHER STATED THAT THE "APPROPRIATE INFORMATION" ON THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS REQUESTED IN UNGA RES 32/87 G PARA 4 WOULD BE PROVIDED IN THEIR PLENARY SPEECH. THERE WOULD BE NO SEPARATE REPORT. LEONARD SAID THIS APPEARED TO BE A SATISFACTORY WAY OF DEALING WITH THE REQUEST.

6. AS FURTHER ASPECT OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT SECTION IN THE PROGRAM OF ACTION, LEONARD URGED SOVIETS TO RECONSIDER THEIR REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR AN AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR NEUTRON WEAPONS. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION FOLLOWED BY BREZHNEV'S APRIL 25 STATEMENT SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO TAKE THIS ISSUE OFF OUR AGENDA. THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING A TREATY. FURTHER ATTENTION TO ERW AT THE SSOD, CAN CAUSE PROBLEMS AND MOREOVER WOULD OBSCURE THE FACT

THAT IN EFFECT WE HAVE DEALT WITH THIS PROBLEM.
YARMOLINSKY ADDED THAT EXACERBATION OF THE ERW ISSUE
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AT THE SPECIAL SESSION WOULD ALSO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT
FOR US TO ATTAIN OUR NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES BY
PROVIDING SOME NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WITH PRETEXT FOR
ACCUSING US OF FAILING TO MOVE AHEAD ON PROBLEMS OF
VERTIFCAL PROLIFERATION. ISSRAELIAN REPLIED THAT SOVIET
POSITION WOULD BE BASED ON BREZHNEV'S APRIL 25 SPEECH
WHICH INDICATED THAT ERW PROBLEM STILL WAS NOT FULLY
RESOLVED.

7. CTB. ISSRAELIAN INDICATED THAT SOVIETS MAY REOPEN
CTB, TEXT TO WHICH THERE HAD BEEN AD REFERENDUM AGREEMENT
OF ALL DELEGATION AT PREPCOM V. THEY PREFER THE
DELETION OF THE LAST PHRASE, "AND THE RESULT SUBMITTED
FOR FULL CONSIDERATION BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT WITH A VIEW TO THE SUBMISSION OF A DRAFT
TREATY TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY." TIMERBAEV INDICATED

THAT SOVIET POSITION ON SUBMITTING COMPLETE TREATY TO
CCD HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH US DELEGATION TO THE CTB
NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. EVEN THOUGH THE LANGUAGE
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REFERRED TO ABOVE WAS TAKEN FROM THE CTB RESOLUTION
AT THE 32ND UNGA, TO WHICH SOVIETS AND WE AGREED,
TIMERBAEV SAID THAT THE RISK OF OPENING THE TREATY
FOR FURTHER REVISION AFTER CONCLUSION OF TRIPARTITE
NEGOTIATIONS WAS A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THEM. LEONARD
SUGGESTED SOVIETS DISCUSS THIS MATTER FURTHER WITH
US DEL IN GENEVA NEXT WEEK. HE ALSO NOTED INDIAN URGING
THAT CTB TEXT BE SUBMITTED TO CCD BY AUGUST IN ORDER
TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME FOR ITS CONSIDERATION THERE
AND SUBMISSION TO THE 33RD UNGA. ISSRAELIAN SAID
SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE ANY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH
ARBITRARY DEADLINES.

8. SECURITY ASSURANCES. ISSRAELIAN ASKED FOR INFOR-
MATION ON PROPOSED BRITISH FORMULATION AND INQUIRED AS
TO WHETHER US INTENDED TO OFFER A NEW STATEMENT ON
NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES. HE ALSO NOTED THAT
BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT ON SECURITY ASSURANCES IN HIS APRIL
25 SPEECH WAS NEW. LEONARD INDICATED THAT THE ISSUE
ALONG WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER POSSIBLE INITIATIVES, WAS
UNDER CAREFUL REVIEW IN WASHINGTON BUT NO DECISION
HAD YET BEEN REACHED. HE ALSO PROVIDED GENERAL
DESCRIPTION OF UK TENTATIVE FORMULATION AS PROVIDING
NEGATIVE ASSURANCES TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES IN
LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA AND ASIA WITH SPECIAL PROVISION
FOR THE SITUATION IN EUROPE.

9. NON-PROLIFERATION. ISSRAELIAN AND LEONARD AGREED
THAT WE HAVE COMMON INTEREST IN STRONG TEXT IN SUPPORT
OF OUR COMMON NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES. THEY ALSO
AGREED THAT PAKISTANI PROPOSAL FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL
PROGRAM UNDER UN AUSPICES FOR PROMOTION OF TRANSFER

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AND UTILIZATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WAS UNDESIRABLE AND UNNECESSARY. LEONARD NOTED THAT MAJOR NON-ALIGNED CONTENTION WAS FAILURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO MEET THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER NPT ART VI. HE SAID THAT US AND USSR SHOULD HIGHLIGHT THE PROGRESS IN SALT AND CTB NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO MAKE CLEAR THE INACCURACY OF THESE CHARGES. THE SOVIETS AGREED.

10. PROSPECTS FOR CONSENSUS AT SSOD. IN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON LIKELY OUTCOME OF THE SPECIAL SESSION, BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZED THE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF ATTAINING A CONSENSUS. ISSRAELYAN SAID SOVIETS WILL OPPOSE EFFORTS TO VOTE ON PARTS OF THE FINAL DOCUMENTS AND WILL DO THEIR BEST TO WORK OUT ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISES. WHILE US AND SOVIETS DO NOT AGREE ON ALL ISSUES, HE CONTINUED, WE SHOULD TRY TO WORK TOGETHER ON THOSE SUBJECTS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE AND IN WHICH WE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST --I.E., SALT, CTB, NON-PROLIFERATION AND MACHINERY. LEONARD URGED
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THAT WE AGREE NOT TO USE THE NON-ALIGNED AGAINST EACH OTHER; ISSRAELYAN DID NOT RESPOND. IN CONCLUDING THE DISCUSSION ON THE PROGRAM OF ACTION, ISSRAELYAN AGAIN URGED US TO GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE FOR ATTAINING CONSENSUS AT THE SSOD ON SOME KIND OF STATEMENT OF INTENT BY THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO START NEGOTIATIONS IN THIS AREA. WE AGREED TO HOLD FURTHER CONSULTATIONS EITHER ON EVE OF OR IN OPENING DAYS OF THE SSOD. TOON

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